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Cyber	  Utilities	  Infrastructure	  and	  Government	  Contracting	  
	  




	   The	  utilities	  critical	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  United	  States	  is	  under	  cyber	  attack	  
and	  there	  is	  no	  plan	  in	  place	  to	  defend	  it.	  	  Hyper-­‐technical	  phrases	  like	  “critical	  
infrastructure”	   and	   “cyber	   security”	   often	   trigger	   muted	   responses,	   but	   the	  
threat	  that	  America	  now	  faces	  is	  serious	  and	  deserves	  focused	  attention.	  	  This	  
note	  takes	  a	  critical	  view	  of	  the	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  U.S.’s	  cyber	  security	  posture.	  	  
It	   will	   specifically	   address	   the	   most	   pressing	   area,	   privately	   operated	   public	  
utilities.	  	  The	  utilities	  sector	  provides	  essential	  services	  that	  impact	  the	  lives	  of	  
every	   American.	   	   That	   sector	   increasingly	   relies	   on	   cyber	   systems	   to	   increase	  
both	  their	  efficiency	  and	  profit	  margins.	   	  Most	  would	  agree	  that	  such	  reliance	  
has	  improved	  the	  utilities	  sector.	  	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  cyber	  
security	   makes	   the	   sector	   vulnerable	   to	   potentially	   debilitating	   attacks.	   	   An	  
attack	   that	   overrides	   a	   dam,	   electric	   grid,	   or	   nuclear	   facility	   would	   have	   a	  
catastrophic	  impact	  on	  the	  country.	  
	   Congress	   has	   attempted	   to	   tackle	   the	   cyber	   security	   problem	   for	   over	   a	  
decade.	   	   The	   obstacles	   posed	   by	   creating	   coherent	   cyber	   security	   are	  
significant.	   	   At	   the	   center	   of	   the	   issue	   is	   a	   constitutional	   battle	   between	   civil	  
liberties	   and	   public	   safety.	   	   While	   Congress	   struggles	   to	   reconcile	   those	   two	  
competing	   interests,	   administrative	   agencies	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   implement	  
stopgap	   defense	  measures.	   	   This	   note	   promotes	   using	   administrative	   agency	  
contracting	   as	   an	   intermediate	   step	   towards	   shoring	   up	   the	   nation’s	   cyber	  
defense.	   	   There	   exists	   a	   cogent	   framework	   for	   public	   safety	   regulation	   of	  
utilities	   through	   contracting.	   	   All	   government	   utility	   contracts	   have	   physical	  
security	   and	   safety	   requirements.	   	   Through	   contracting,	   administrative	  
agencies	  can	  require	  utilities	  companies	  to	  adhere	  to	  cyber	  security	  standards	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  they	  require	  physical	  security	  standards.	  	  This	  stopgap	  solution	  
would	  provide	  much	  needed	  support	  to	  a	  vulnerable	  area	  of	  national	  defense.	  	  




                                                
∗	  University	  of	  Miami	  School	  of	  Law,	  Class	  of	  2014.	  	  Special	  thanks	  to	  Professor	  William	  Widen	  
for	  supervising	  this	  writing	  project.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  U.	  MIAMI	  NAT’L	  SECURITY	  &	  ARMED	  CONFLICT	  L.	  REV.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  III	  152	  




II.	  UTILITIES	  CRITICAL	  INFRASTRUCTURE.....................................................................156	  
A. Increased	  Attacks.................................................................................156	  
B. Market	  Insulation.................................................................................156	  
C. Calls	  For	  Action.....................................................................................158	  
III.	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  CONGRESS	  IN	  FINDING	  A	  SOLUTION....................................................159	  
A. Cyber	  Security	  Legislation.....................................................................159	  
B. Providing	  Security.................................................................................159	  
C. 2013	  Cyber	  Security	  Legislation............................................................160	  
D. The	  Fourth	  Amendment.......................................................................160	  
E. Learning	  from	  Past	  Failures..................................................................161	  
F. The	  Public-­‐Private	  Relationship	  is	  Essential..........................................162	  
G. Avoiding	  Reactionary	  Measures...........................................................162	  
IV.	  PATCHWORK	  SOLUTIONS..................................................................................163	  
A. 	   Administrative	  Agency	  Solutions..........................................................163	  
B. 	   The	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security................................................163	  
i. Recruiting	  Future	  Cyber	  Warriors...........................................163	  
ii. Addressing	  Current	  Threats	  to	  Utilities	  ..................................164	  
iii. Severity	  of	  the	  Threat...............................................................165	  
V.	  CONTRACTING	  A	  STOPGAP	  FROM	  THE	  EXISTING	  UTILITIES	  FRAMEWORK........................166	  
A. 	   How	  Contracting	  Can	  be	  Effective........................................................166	  
B. 	  Using	  Preexisting	  Contract	  Frameworks................................................166	  
i. Two	  Potential	  Approaches.......................................................167	  
VI.	  CONSEQUENCES	  OF	  FAILING	  TO	  ACT....................................................................168	  
A. 	   Attacks	  in	  Perspective.........................................................................168	  
B. 	   Cyber	  Attack	  on	  Georgia.....................................................................169	  




2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cyber	  Utilities	  Infrastructure	  and	  Government	  Contracting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   153	  
153	  
153	  
I.	  	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  
“If	  the	  enemy	  opens	  the	  door,	  you	  must	  race	  in.”⎯Sun	  Tzu1	  
	  
	   The	   cyber	   systems	   that	   control	   the	   U.S.’s	   critical	   infrastructure	   are	   under	  
attack.	   	   To	   date,	   cyber	   systems	   have	   made	   U.S.	   critical	   infrastructure	   more	  
efficient	  and	  effective.	  	  With	  the	  click	  of	  a	  mouse,	  an	  automated	  control	  system	  
can	  regulate	  water	  flow	  to	  a	  dam,	  or	  electricity	  to	  a	  town.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  U.S.	  
has	   become	   reliant	   on	   cyber	   systems,	   particularly	   private-­‐operated	   public	  
utilities.2	  	  	  The	  increased	  reliance	  on	  these	  systems	  has	  made	  them	  vulnerable	  
to	   cyber	   attacks.3	   	   Cyber	   aggressors	   target	   the	   U.S.’s	   utilities	   critical	  
infrastructure	   (“utilities”)	   to	   steal,	   deny,	   and	   destroy	   its	   capabilities.	   Today,	  
sophisticated	   cyber	   aggressors	   launch	   attacks	   while	   remaining	   largely	  
unidentified	   and	  undetected.	   	   The	   concern	   is	   that	   a	   coordinated	   attack	   could	  
expose	  whole	   sections	  of	   the	  population	   to	   the	   risk	  of	  war-­‐like	  harm	  without	  
firing	  a	  single	  bullet.4	   	  This	  concern	  grows	  daily	  as	  the	  U.S.’s	  reliance	  on	  cyber	  
systems	   outpaces	   its	   cyber	   security	   posture.	   	   The	   there	   is	   no	   national	   cyber	  
defense	   in	   place	   to	   protect	   U.S.	   critical	   infrastructure	   cyber	   systems.5	   	   This	  
unacceptable	  situation	  must	  be	  resolved.	  	  	  
	   Congress	  is	  the	  only	  governmental	  body	  that	  can	  establish	  a	  comprehensive	  
cyber	  defense.	  	  Yet,	  it	  has	  failed	  to	  pass	  legislation	  to	  protect	  the	  cyber	  systems	  
that	   control	   the	   nation’s	   critical	   infrastructure.	   	   The	   challenges	   that	   Congress	  
faces	   in	   creating	   a	   cyber	   defense	   network	   are	   formidable.	   	   The	   core	   issue	   is	  
establishing	   a	   balance	   between	   civil	   liberties	   and	   public	   safety.	   	   Although	  
Congress	   has	  worked	   for	   over	   a	   decade	   to	   find	   a	   solution,	   no	   legislation	   has	  
materialized.	   	   Congress	   must	   work	   to	   inform	   the	   public	   of	   the	   threat	   cyber	  
attacks	  pose	  to	  private	  businesses,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  government.	   	  The	  private	  
companies	   that	  make	  up	  much	  of	   the	  nation’s	  critical	   infrastructure	  are	  a	  key	  
component.	   	   These	   businesses	   have	   unique	   intergovernmental	   relationships.	  	  
They	  are	  the	  U.S.’s	  front	  line	  of	  defense	  against	  cyber	  attacks.	  	  When	  they	  are	  
attacked,	   the	  nation	  suffers.	   	  These	  businesses	  must	  be	  protected.	  They	  must	  
also	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  threats	  cyber	  attacks	  pose	  to	  them	  and	  the	  nation.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Privately	  owned	  utilities	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  cyber	  attacks.	  	  Utility	  companies	  
                                                
1	  Sun	  Tzu,	  THE	  ART	  OF	  WAR	  92	  (Lionel	  Giles	  trans.,	  Dover	  Publications	  Inc.	  2002).	  	  
2	  Janet	  Napolitano,	  Sec’y,	  Dep’t	  of	  Homeland	  Security,	  Remarks	  at	  the	  San	  Jose	  State	  Univ.	  
Interdisciplinary	  Cybersecurity	  Program	  (Apr.	  16,	  2012),	  
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/04/16/remarks-­‐secretary-­‐janet-­‐napolitano-­‐san-­‐jose-­‐state-­‐
university.	  	  	  	  
3	  Id.	  	  
4	  Tzu,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  48.	  	  
5	  David	  A.	  Fulghum,	  Russia	  Recruited	  Civilians	  For	  Cyber	  Attacks	  On	  Georgia,	  AEROSPACE	  DAILY	  &	  
DEF.	  REPORT,	  Aug.	  26,	  2009,	  at	  4.	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leverage	   cyber	   control	   systems	   for	   the	   benefits,	   but	   often	   fail	   to	   implement	  
basic	   security	   measures	   for	   their	   own	   protection.6	   	   Where	   increased	  
vulnerability	   would	   generally	   force	   businesses	   to	   secure	   themselves,	   utilities	  
remain	   largely	   unchanged.	   	   This	   is	   in	   large	   part	   because	   public-­‐private	  
relationship	   between	   utilities	   and	   the	   government	   makes	   them	   resistant	   to	  
traditional	   market	   pressures.7	   Utility	   companies	   have	   traditionally	   had	  
government	   protections	   that	   insulate	   them	   from	   the	   market.8	   	   Additionally,	  
liability	  claims	  against	  utilities	  are	  generally	  subject	  to	  choice	  of	   law	  rules	  that	  
further	   insulate	   them	   from	   liability	   suits.9	   	   As	   a	   result,	   utilities	   have	   little	  
incentive	  to	  enhance	  their	  cyber	  security	  posture.	   	  These	  factors	  create	  fertile	  
conditions	  for	  cyber	  attacks.	  	  	  
	   Utilities	  infrastructure	  is	  a	  blind	  spot	  in	  the	  nation’s	  cyber	  defense.	  	  In	  order	  
to	   understand	   and	   prevent	   threats,	   the	   government	  must	   be	   able	   to	   analyze	  
attacks	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  they	  happen.	   	  Public-­‐private	  cooperation	   is	  a	  
critical	   component	   to	   developing	   a	   coherent	   cyber	   defense.10	   The	   U.S.	  
government	  cannot	  force	  private	  companies	  to	  disclose	  information	  on	  attacks	  
to	  cyber	  systems.	  	  Yet,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  requisite	  level	  of	  responsiveness,	  
the	   government	   must	   be	   informed	   about	   current	   and	   future	   threats.	   The	  
government	  must	  be	  able	   to	   identify	   threats	  and	   trends	  with	  enough	   time	   to	  
respond.	  	  Requiring	  companies	  to	  grant	  government	  access	  would	  infringe	  upon	  
civil	   liberties.	   	   If	   it	   facilitates	   an	   environment	   of	   information	   sharing,	   private	  
companies	  can	  simply	  decline	  to	  participate.	  	  Striking	  the	  balance	  between	  civil	  
liberties	  and	  public	  safety	  has	  created	  gridlock	   in	  Congress	  over	  how	  to	  cover	  
this	  blind	  spot	  in	  cyber	  defense.	  
	   Administrative	  agency	  officials	  have	  grown	  impatient	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  cyber	  
defense	   legislation.	   	  As	  a	   result,	   they	  have	  begun	  engaging	   the	  public	  directly	  
about	  the	  need	  for	  a	  national	  cyber	  security	  strategy.11	  	  Administrative	  agencies	  
are	   also	   implementing	   their	   own	   patchwork	   solutions	   to	   curb	   the	   impact	   of	  
                                                
6	  David	  Goldman,	  Hacker	  Hits	  on	  U.S.	  Power	  and	  Nuclear	  Targets	  Spiked	  in	  2012,	  CNN	  MONEY	  
(January	  9,	  2013,	  1:41	  PM),	  
http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/09/technology/security/infrastructure-­‐cyberattacks.	  	  
7	  GMC	  v.	  Tracy,	  519	  U.S.	  278,	  289-­‐90	  (1997)	  (stating	  that	  regulated	  monopolies	  are	  consistent	  
with	  the	  commerce	  clause),	  see	  also	  Panhandle	  Eastern	  Pipe	  Line	  Co.	  v.	  Michigan	  Pub.	  Serv.	  
Comm'n,	  341	  U.S.	  329,	  333	  (stating	  that	  public	  utilities	  sold	  to	  local	  private	  and	  industrial	  
customers	  is	  generally	  regulated	  by	  states).	  	  	  
8	  GMC,	  519	  U.S.	  at	  289-­‐90.	  	  
9	  28	  U.S.C.	  §1346(b)(1),	  see	  also	  Richards	  v.	  United	  States,	  369	  U.S.	  1,	  10,	  (1962)	  (stating	  that	  
the	  choice	  of	  law	  rules	  in	  state	  where	  negligence	  occurred	  apply	  to	  claims	  for	  damages).	  
10	  Michael	  Bruno,	  Pentagon	  Nears	  Completion	  Of	  New	  Cyber	  Rules	  Of	  Engagement,	  AEROSPACE	  
DAILY	  &	  DEF.	  REPORT,	  Jun.	  28,	  2013,	  at	  6.	  
11	  	  Leon	  Panetta,	  Sec’y,	  Dep’t	  of	  Def.,	  Remarks	  at	  the	  Bus.	  Execs.	  for	  Nat’l	  Sec.	  (Oct.	  11,	  2012),	  
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136.	  	  	  	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cyber	  Utilities	  Infrastructure	  and	  Government	  Contracting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   155	  155	  
cyber	  threats.	  	  The	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  (the	  “DHS”),	  in	  particular,	  
has	   implemented	   several	   innovative	   programs.12	   	   To	   address	   future	   threats,	  
DHS	  has	   initiated	   a	   cyber	  warrior	   recruiting	   campaign	  on	   college	   campuses.13	  	  
To	   address	   current	   threats,	   it	   has	   initiated	   programs	   based	   on	   public-­‐private	  
information	   sharing.14	   	   Although	   these	   agency	   programs	   are	   addressing	   the	  
cyber	  threat	  and	  reducing	  the	  impact	  of	  cyber	  attacks,	  more	  must	  be	  done.	  	  	  
	   Administrative	   agencies	   should	   require	   all	   utility	   companies	   with	  
government	   contracts	   to	  maintain	   a	  minimum	   level	   of	   cyber	   security.	   	   Cyber	  
security	   requirements	   could	   seamlessly	   be	   incorporated	   into	   this	   well-­‐worn	  
framework.	   	   A	  minimum	   cyber	   security	   requirement	  would	   allow	   the	   current	  
utilities	   scheme	   to	   remain	   intact.	   	   Contracting	   could	   be	   used	   to	   leverage	   the	  
unique	   public-­‐private	   relationship	   to	   its	   advantage.	   	   The	   federal	   government	  
currently	  requires	  utilities	  to	  adhere	  to	  security	  and	  safety	  standards.15	  	  Specific	  
cyber	   security	   requirements	   can	   be	   monitored	   much	   like	   physical	   security	  
requirements.	  	  This	  minimum	  requirement	  would	  also	  reduce	  the	  government’s	  
need	  for	  information	  on	  attacks,	  allowing	  it	  to	  focus	  on	  significant	  threats	  and	  
trends.	   	   A	   minimum	   level	   of	   cyber	   security	   in	   utilities	   would	   mitigate	  
coordinated	  cyber	  attacks.	  	  The	  result	  would	  yield	  a	  minimum	  cyber	  defense	  for	  
the	  most	  vulnerable	  critical	  infrastructure	  sector.	  
	   The	  consequences	   for	   failing	   to	  prepare	   for	  cyber	  warfare	  are	  a	  dire.	   	  The	  
Russian	   invasion	  of	  Georgia	   is	  one	  example	  of	  how	  cyber	  attacks	  will	   likely	  be	  
employed	  in	  the	  near	  future.16	  	  There,	  coordinated	  cyber	  attacks	  debilitated	  the	  
Georgian	  government’s	  communication	  and	  response	  nodes.17	   	  After	  Georgian	  
cyber	   systems	   were	   degraded,	   Russia	   physically	   invaded	   with	   its	   military.18	  	  
Coordinated	   cyber	   attacks	   of	   the	   future	   will	   certainly	   be	   larger	   in	   scope	   and	  
magnitude.	  	  The	  cyber	  attacks	  that	  preceded	  the	  Georgian	  invasion	  are	  a	  clarion	  
call	  for	  what	  may	  come	  if	  America	  fails	  to	  mends	  the	  holes	  in	  its	  cyber	  defense.	  	  	  
	   Part	  II	  of	  this	  note	  details	  the	  current	  utilities	  critical	  infrastructure.	  	  Part	  III	  
discusses	  the	  challenges	  Congress	  faces	   in	  establishing	  a	  comprehensive	  cyber	  
                                                
12	  	  See	  US-­‐CERT,	  http://www.us-­‐cert.gov/about-­‐us.	  	  
13	  Nicole	  Perloth,	  Luring	  Young	  Web	  Warriors	  Is	  a	  U.S.	  Priority.	  It’s	  Also	  a	  Game,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  
Mar.	  24,	  2013,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/technology/united-­‐states-­‐wants-­‐to-­‐
attract-­‐hackers-­‐to-­‐public-­‐sector.html.	  	  
14	  	  See	  ICS-­‐CERT,	  http://www.us-­‐cert.gov	  (last	  visited	  Aug.	  1,	  2013).	  	  
15	  See	  FAR	  52.241-­‐6	  (1995),	  available	  at	  
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/reissue/FARvol2ForPaperOnly.pdf.	  	  	  
16	  Anne	  Barnard,	  Georgia	  and	  Russia	  Nearing	  All-­‐Out	  War,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Aug.	  9,	  2008,	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/world/europe/10georgia.html.	  	  	  	  
17	  Jaak	  Aviksoo,	  Minister	  of	  Def.	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Estonia,	  Address	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Strategic	  
and	  International	  Studies:	  Cyberspace	  a	  New	  Dimension	  at	  our	  Fingertips	  (Nov.	  28,	  2007),	  
available	  at	  http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/071128_estonia.pdf.	  	  	  	  
18	  Id.	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defense.	   	   Part	   IV	   explores	   patchwork	   solutions	   that	   administrative	   agencies	  
have	   implemented	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   mitigate	   cyber	   attacks	   in	   utilities.	   Part	   V	  
discusses	   how	   administrative	   agencies	   can	   leverage	   the	   existing	   government-­‐
contract	   framework	   to	   establish	   minimum	   cyber	   security	   requirements	   for	  
utilities	  companies.	  	  Part	  VI	  illustrates	  the	  consequences	  for	  failing	  to	  establish	  
a	  coherent	  cyber	  defense,	  using	  the	  Russian	  attack	  on	  Georgia	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  	  	  
	  
II.	  UTILITIES	  CRITICAL	  INFRASTRUCTURE	  
	  
A. Increased	  Attacks	  
	  
	   The	  nation’s	  critical	  infrastructure	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  cyber	  attack	  and	  must	  be	  
protected.	   	   In	   recent	   years,	   critical	   infrastructure	   has	   increased	   productivity	  
and	   efficiency	   by	   relying	   on	   cyberspace	   network	   control	   systems.19	   	   Critical	  
infrastructures	  are	  the	  systems,	  networks,	  and	  assets	  so	  vital	  to	  the	  nation	  that	  
their	  incapacitation	  or	  destruction	  would	  severely	  degrade	  the	  country’s	  ability	  
to	  function.20	   	  Critical	   infrastructures	  are	  primarily	  the	  financial,	  energy21,	  and	  
emergency	  services	  sectors.22	   	  Critical	   infrastructures	  rely	  on	  control	  nodes	  to	  
leverage	   cyberspace	   to	   increase	   productivity	   and	   efficiency.	   	   Cyberspace	   is	  
comprised	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  computers,	  servers,	  and	  control	  nodes	  
connected	  by	   fiber	  optic	   cables.23	   	   Cyber	   attacks	  have	  dramatically	   increased	  
over	   the	   past	   decade.24	   	   Attacker	   capacity	   is	   a	   legitimate	   threat	   to	   national	  
security.	   	   Individual	   groups	   as	   well	   as	   other	   countries	   are	   attacking	   utilities	  
control	  nodes.25	   	   Those	  entities	  are	  bypassing	   the	  U.S.’s	   traditional	   land,	   sea,	  
and	   air	   defenses	   by	   exploiting	   cyber	   vulnerabilities.26	   	   Utilities	   critical	  
infrastructure	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  attacked	  until	  cyber	  security	  improves.	  	  	  
	  
B. Market	  Insulation	  
	  
	   Utilities	   are	   insulated	   from	   the	   socioeconomic	   pressures	   that	   affect	  
businesses	   in	   other	   sectors.	   	   The	   financial	   critical	   infrastructure	   sector	   for	  
example,	  is	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  socioeconomic	  pressures.	  	  Cyber	  attacks	  on	  the	  
financial	   sector	   erode	   consumer	   confidence,	   halt	   markets,	   and	   expose	  
                                                
19	  Napolitano,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	  
20	  Critical	  Infrastructure	  Protections	  Act	  of	  2001,	  §1016	  42	  U.S.C.	  §5195c	  (2001).	  	  
21	  In	  this	  note	  the	  energy	  sector	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  utilities	  sector.	  	  
22	  42	  U.S.C.	  §5195c.	  
23	  US-­‐CERT,	  THE	  NAT’L	  STRATEGY	  TO	  SECURE	  CYBERSPACE	  1,	  available	  at	  http://www.us-­‐
cert.gov/reading_room/cyberspace_strategy.pdf.	  
24	  Id.	  at	  6.	  	  
25	  Siobhan	  Gorman,	  Alert	  on	  Hacker	  Power	  Play:	  U.S.	  Official	  Signals	  Growing	  Concern	  Over	  
Anonymous	  Group's	  Capabilities,	  WALL	  ST.	  JOURNAL,	  Feb.	  21,	  2012,	  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204059804577229390105521090.html.	  	  
26	  Tzu,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  62.	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confidential	   consumer	   information.27	   	   When	   consumers	   discover	   that	   banks	  
have	   lost	   control	   of	   their	   information	   or	   assets,	   they	   demand	   better	  
protections.	   	   If	  additional	  protections	  are	  not	  provided,	  consumers	   take	   their	  
business	  elsewhere.	   	   Socioeconomic	  pressures	   incentivize	   the	   financial	   sector	  
to	  proactively	  respond	  to	  cyber	  related	  threats.	  	  Utilities	  are	  not	  as	  responsive	  
to	  market	  pressures	  in	  part	  because	  of	  their	  legal	  history.	  	  	  
	   Historically,	   courts	   have	   validated	   government-­‐subsidized	   monopolies	   in	  
the	   utilities	   sector.28	   	   Courts	   generally	   have	   held	   that	   these	   monopoly	  
arrangements	   are	   legitimate	   government	   pursuits	   and	   in	   accord	   with	   the	  
Commerce	   Clause.29	   Unlike	   in	   the	   financial	   sector,	   changing	   regional	   utility	  
providers	  can	  be	  a	  bit	  more	  challenging,	   if	  not	   impossible.	   	   In	  addition,	  utility	  
companies	   are	   at	   times	   not	   held	   liable	   for	   damages	   caused	   from	   their	  
services.30	   	   While	   the	   government	   may	   be	   liable	   for	   damages	   caused	   by	  
negligence31,	  state	  law	  governs	  whether	  there	  are	  grounds	  to	  bring	  the	  claim.32	  	  
Utilities	  claims	  are	  filed	  pursuant	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  law	  rules	  where	  the	  alleged	  
act	  occurred.33	   	  This	   legal	   framework	  provides	   little	   incentive	   for	   filing	  claims	  
for	   damages	   against	   utilities.	   	   With	   limited	   exposure	   to	   legal	   recourse	   from	  
consumers	   for	   damages,	   utilities	   are	   inadequately	   incentivized	   to	   increase	  
cyber	  security.	  As	  a	  result,	  utilities	  are	  exposed	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  cyber	  attacks	  
without	  an	  adequate	  defense.	  
	   Although	  helpful,	   self-­‐preservation	  prompted	  by	   socioeconomic	  pressures	  
is	  not	  the	  solution.	   	  The	  free	  market	  approach	  yields	  an	  unreliable	  patchwork	  
defense.	   	   For	   example,	   in	   2010,	   hackers	   launched	   a	   denial-­‐of-­‐service	   attack	  
(“DoS	  attack”)	  on	  the	  NASDAQ	  website	  creating	  a	  temporarily	  jolting	  disruption	  
                                                
27	  Jenny	  B.	  Davis,	  Cybercrime	  Fighters:	  Companies	  Have	  More	  Legal	  Weapons	  to	  Defend	  Against	  
Attacks	  on	  Their	  Computer	  Systems,	  89	  A.B.A.	  J.,	  Aug.	  2003,	  at	  36.	  	  
28	  GMC,	  519	  U.S.	  at	  	  289-­‐90.	  (1997),	  see	  also	  Panhandle	  Eastern	  Pipe	  Line	  Co.,	  341	  U.S.	  at	  333.	  	  
29	  Huron	  Portland	  Cement	  Co.	  v.	  Detroit,	  362	  U.S.	  440,	  443-­‐44	  (1960)	  (stating	  that	  state	  actions	  
that	  indirectly	  affect	  commerce	  do	  not	  prohibit	  states	  from	  legislating	  on	  the	  health,	  life,	  and	  
safety	  of	  their	  citizens,	  though	  the	  legislation	  might	  indirectly	  affect	  commerce),	  see	  also	  
Gibbons	  v.	  Ogden,	  22	  U.S.	  at	  1,	  21	  (1824)	  (stating	  that	  States	  can	  enact	  legislation	  that	  creates	  
monopolies	  and	  regulate	  commerce	  for	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  community	  so	  long	  as	  it	  does	  not	  
encroach	  on	  ground	  constitutionally	  reserved	  for	  the	  exclusive	  control	  of	  Congress.),	  see,	  e.g.,	  
Hall	  v.	  De	  Cuir,	  95	  U.S.	  485,	  488	  (1878)	  (stating	  that	  state	  legislation	  that	  regulates	  commerce	  
within	  the	  state	  but	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  influence	  interstate	  commerce	  does	  not	  violate	  interstate	  
commerce).	  	  
30	  Maxim	  Integrated	  Prods.	  v.	  United	  States,	  1988	  Cal.	  Unrep.,	  *1,	  *18	  (N.D.	  Cal.	  Dec.	  4,	  1998).	  
31	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1346(b)(1),	  see	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Muniz,	  374	  U.S.	  150,	  153	  (1963)	  (stating	  that	  
a	  claim	  against	  the	  government	  can	  be	  made	  where	  a	  private	  person	  under	  like	  circumstances	  
would	  be	  liable	  under	  state	  law).	  
32	  United	  Scottish	  Ins.	  Co.	  v.	  United	  States.,	  614	  F.2d	  188,	  195-­‐96	  (9th	  Cir.	  1979).	  
33	  28	  U.S.C.	  §1346(b)(1);	  see	  also	  Richards,	  369	  U.S.	  at	  10.	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of	   the	   market.34	   	   DoS	   attacks	   seek	   to	   make	   cyber	   systems	   inaccessible	   by	  
engaging	   them	   for	   prolonged	   periods	   of	   time	   from	   thousands	   of	   individual	  
computers.35	   	   In	   2011,	   the	   hacker	   group	   “Anonymous”	   attempted	   to	   "erase"	  
the	   NYSE	   webpage	   as	   a	   gesture	   of	   support	   for	   the	   Occupy	   Wall	   Street	  
protests.36	   	   These	   examples	   illustrate	   the	   limitations	   of	   relying	   solely	   on	  
socioeconomic	  pressures	  as	  a	  defense	  to	  cyber	  attacks.	  	  Yet,	  as	  thin	  as	  the	  layer	  
of	   cyber	   security	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   is,	   it	   is	   virtually	   non-­‐existent	   in	   the	  
utilities	  sector.	  	  	  
	  
C. Calls	  for	  Action	  
	  
	   The	  chorus	  of	  U.S.	  officials	  warning	  about	  utilities	  vulnerabilities	  is	  growing.	  	  
Within	  the	  various	  echelons	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  agency	  leaders	  are	  voicing	  
their	   concerns	   about	   cyber	   attacks.	   	   Former	   Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Leon	   E.	  
Panetta	  compared	  the	  current	  cyber	  threat	  to	  Pearl	  Harbor.37	  	  The	  Secretary’s	  
World	  War	   II	  analogy	  warns	  of	  a	   large-­‐scale	  surprise	  attack	  on	  several	  critical	  
infrastructures.	   	   The	   result	   of	   that	   attack	   would	   be	   a	   massive	   disruption	   of	  
services	   and	   loss	   of	   life.38	   	   According	   to	   Panetta,	   hackers	   have	   already	  
infiltrated	  electricity	  and	  water	  plant	  cyber	  control	  systems.39	  	  Echoing	  Panetta,	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Kerry,	  during	  his	  Senate	  confirmation	  hearings,	  warned	  
the	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee	  of	  the	  dangers	  cyber	  attacks	  pose	  to	  
the	   nation’s	   energy	   sector.40	   	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Homeland	  
Security	   Janet	   Napolitano	   characterized	   utilities	   attacks	   as	   setting	   up	   a	  
potential	  “cyber	  9/11.”41	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  legislative	  solutions,	  these	  agency	  
heads	  are	  implementing	  stopgap	  measures	  to	  combat	  cyber	  threats.	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III.	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  CONGRESS	  IN	  FINDING	  A	  SOLUTION	  
	  
A. Cyber	  Security	  Legislation	  
	  
	   Congress	  must	  find	  a	  way	  to	  pass	  comprehensive	  cyber	  security	  legislation.	  	  
Congress	   is	   the	  only	  governmental	  body	  capable	  of	   creating	  a	   comprehensive	  
cyber	  security	  plan.42	  	  Cyber	  security	  legislation	  has	  steadily	  gained	  support	  for	  
securing	  critical	  infrastructure	  since	  the	  year	  2000.43	  	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  cyber-­‐security	  bills	  was	  the	  Cyber	  Security	  
Enhancement	   Act	   of	   2012	   (“CSA2012”).44	   	   The	   bill	   never	   made	   it	   out	   of	  
committee	  however,	  failing	  to	  acquire	  the	  60	  votes	  needed	  for	  a	  Senate	  general	  
member	   vote.45	   	   CSA2012	   attempted	   to	   tackle	   two	   of	   Congress’	   biggest	  
challenges:	  (1)	  maintaining	  civil	  liberties,	  and	  (2)	  ensuring	  public	  safety.	  	  The	  bill	  
addressed	   civil	   liberties	   in	   Section	   204	   through	   the	   promotion	   of	   public	  
awareness	  and	  education	  about	  current	  cyber	  threats.46	  	  The	  section	  called	  for	  
efforts	   to	  make	   cyber	   security	   best	   practices	   known	   and	   usable	   to	   all	   public	  
businesses.47	   	   The	   effort	   was	   strengthened	   by	   a	   late	   amendment	   that	  
specifically	   allowed	   the	   government	   to	   share	   threat	   information	  with	   private	  
industries	  controlling	  critical	   infrastructure.48	   	  These	  were	  much-­‐needed	  steps	  
in	  the	  right	  direction.	  	  	  
	  
B. Providing	  for	  Security	  
	  
	   The	  public	  must	  be	   informed	  of	  the	  threats	  cyber	  attacks	  pose	  to	  national	  
security.	  	  Section	  203	  of	  the	  bill	  addressed	  the	  security	  technical	  standards	  for	  
providing	  adequate	  security	  to	  critical	  infrastructure.49	  	  Specifically,	  Section	  203	  
called	   for	   the	  accelerated	  development	  of	   interoperable	  security	   standards	   to	  
secure	  interoperability	  between	  the	  government	  and	  private	  businesses.50	  	  The	  
section	   also	   called	   for	   security	   frameworks	   that	   complied	   with	   privacy	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requirements.51	   	   This	  was	   an	   effort	   to	   ensure	   a	   firm	   line	   between	  public	   and	  
private	   cooperation	   would	   be	   observed.	   	   Interoperability,	   collaboration,	   and	  
privacy	  assurance	  are	  essential	   to	   creating	  a	   coherent	   cyber	  defense	  network	  
that	  spans	  government	  and	  private	  business	  systems.	  	  
	  
C. Cyber	  Security	  Legislation	  in	  2013	  
	  
	   The	   Cyber	   Security	   and	   American	   Cyber	   Competitiveness	   Act	   of	   2013	  
(“S.21”)	   was	   introduced	   to	   the	   Senate	   and	   referred	   to	   the	   Committee	   on	  
Homeland	  Security	  and	  Government	  Affairs.52	   	  S.21	  sets	  a	  broad	  set	  of	  criteria	  
in	   order	   to	   gain	   consensus.	   	   Specifically,	   it	   seeks	   to	   create	   a	   framework	   for	  
developing	   public-­‐private	   systems	   that	   protect	   critical	   infrastructure,	   such	   as	  
utilities.53	   	   A	   focal	   point	   of	   S.21	   is	   the	   attempt	   to	   find	   the	   balance	   been	   civil	  
liberties	  and	  public	  safety	  that	  CSA2012	  could	  not.54	   	  Although	  the	  bill	   is	   in	   its	  
initial	   stages,	   Congress	   should	   incorporate	   the	   sections	   203	   and	   204	   of	  
CSA2012.	  	  Those	  sections	  should	  be	  foundational	  components	  of	  the	  legislation	  
because	  they	  contain	  innovative	  proposals	  for	  public	  safety	  and	  the	  protection	  
of	  civil	  liberties.	  	  
	  
D. The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  	  
	  
	   The	  legislative	  solution	  must	  be	  congruent	  with	  the	  spirit	  and	  the	  letter	  of	  
the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution.	   	   The	   Fourth	   Amendment	  
affords	  U.S.	  citizens	  the	  right	  to	  be	  secure	  in	  their	  persons,	  houses,	  papers,	  and	  
effects,	   against	   unreasonable	   searches	   and	   seizures.55	   	   In	   order	   to	   prevent	  
warrantless	  monitoring,	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  must	  govern	  any	  proposal	  for	  
government	   access	   to	   private	   utilities	   networks.56	   	   Yet,	   some	   government	  
officials	  have	  proposed	  unilateral	  executive	  action.	  	  Notably,	  Secretary	  Panetta	  
stated	   that,	   although	   there	   is	   no	   substitute	   for	   legislation,	   the	   Obama	  
administration	  is	  working	  on	  an	  executive	  order	  on	  cyber	  security.57	   	  Although	  
Panetta’s	  appeals	  to	  urgency	  may	  be	  well	   founded,	  government	   intrusion	   into	  
private	  businesses	  is	  not	  a	  solution.	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   The	   U.S.	   government	   cannot	   handle	   this	   threat	   alone.	   	   Government	  
intrusions	   into	   homes	   and	   businesses	   will	   not	   create	   secure	   cyber	   networks.	  	  
The	   interdependent	   relationship	   between	   government	   and	   critical	  
infrastructure	   companies	   relies	   on	   each	   party	   accessing	   cyberspace	   to	   secure	  
the	   space	   that	   they	   own,	   or	   operate	   in.58	   Director	   of	   the	   National	   Security	  
Agency	  General	  Keith	  Alexander	  noted	  that	  complex	  problems	  posed	  by	  cyber	  
attacks	   do	   not	   require	   sacrificing	   civil	   liberties	   for	   security.59	   	   Establishing	   a	  
common	  ground	  between	  security	  and	  civil	   liberties	  should	  be	  a	  starting	  point	  
in	  establishing	  a	  comprehensive	  cyber	  defense.	  	  	  
	  
E. Learning	  from	  Past	  Failures	  
	  
	   The	   role	   of	   technology	   in	   the	   debate	   between	   civil	   liberties	   and	   public	  
safety	   is	   not	   new.	   	   In	   the	   1928	   case	  Olmstead	   v.	  United	   States,	   the	   Supreme	  
Court	   debated	   whether	   the	   advantages	   gained	   over	   certain	   criminal	   activity	  
warranted	  narrowing	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  of	  all	  citizens.60	  	  There,	  the	  Court	  
held	  that	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  from	  private	  telephone	  conversations	  intercepted	  
by	   wire-­‐tapping	   was	   not	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   because	   the	  
threat	   outweighed	   the	   need	   for	   civil	   liberties.61	   	   There,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	  
prescribed	  an	  unimaginatively	   rigid	  solution	   that	   resulted	   in	   legal	  government	  
wiretapping.	   	   The	   United	   States	   cannot	   afford	   repeat	   the	   mistakes	   made	   in	  
cases	   like	  Olmstead.	   	  As	   in	  Sections	  203	  and	  204	  of	  CSA2012,	  the	  government	  
must	  promote	  solutions	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  while	  ensuring	  
adequate	   cyber	   security.62	   	  Handwringing	   is	   not	   a	   plan.	   	   Although	   vigilance	   is	  
tempered	  by	  the	  knowledge	  that	  the	  greatest	  threats	  to	  freedom	  come	  in	  times	  
of	   crisis,63	   the	   U.S.	   government	   cannot	   give	   in	   to	   the	   stagnating	   principle	   of	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  Court’s	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  using	  technology	  as	  a	  search	  can	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  search	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  Fourth	  Amendment	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expanded	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  reach	  to	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  protection	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  has	  a	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  expectation	  of	  
privacy).	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  School	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  O’Connor	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F. Public-­‐Private	  Partnership	  is	  Essential	  
	  
	   The	   government	   must	   work	   with,	   rather	   than	   act	   upon	   privately	   owned	  
utilities.	   	   There	   is	   an	   interdependent	   relationship	   between	   utilities	   critical	  
infrastructures	  and	  the	  private	  companies	   that	  own	  and	  operate	  them.64	   	  The	  
balance	   in	   the	   public-­‐private	   relationship	   would	   be	   shattered	   if	   an	  Olmstead	  
approach	   prevailed.	   	   Government	   officials	   that	   push	   for	   coercive	   measures	  
should	  be	  mindful	  not	  to	  alienate	  private	  businesses.	  	  Congress	  must	  continue	  
to	   work	   on	   creating	   a	   solution	   that	   fosters	   public-­‐private	   cooperation.	   	   The	  
government	   must	   strive	   to	   work	   with	   private	   utility	   companies	   on	   common	  
grounds.	   	  The	   largest	  of	  which	   is	   the	  protection	  of	  private	  assets	   that	  directly	  
impact	  the	  lives	  of	  many	  citizens.	  	  
	   The	   government	   seems	   to	   understand	   its	   burden	   in	   creating	   an	   amicable	  
environment	   for	   information	   sharing.	   	   The	   government’s	   approach	   to	   the	  
Einstein	   3	   program	   is	   an	   example	   of	   how	   it	   can	   inform	   and	   build	   public	  
confidence	   in	   cyber	   security.	   	   Einstein	  3	   is	   a	   government	  network	  monitoring	  
system	   that	   detects	   and	   reacts	   to	   cyber	   attacks	   on	   federal	   systems.65	   	   DHS	  
officials	  have	  encouraged	  an	  open	  dialogue	  about	  the	  program	  in	  an	  effort	   to	  
illustrate	   the	  extensive	  privacy	  protections	  already	   in	  place.66	   	  Such	   is	  a	  much	  
needed	   gesture	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   government	   to	   build	   public	   “trust	   and	   strict	  
confidentiality”	  in	  the	  program.67	  	  An	  environment	  where	  the	  government	  and	  
private	  companies	  freely	  exchange	  cyber	  threat	  information	  is	  a	  superior	  model	  
to	  that	  of	  government	  monitoring.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  information	  sharing	  should	  be	  to	  
create	  a	  seamlessly	  integrated	  cyber	  defense	  that	  blocks	  or	  blunts	  attacks.	  	  As	  
cyber	  attacks	  continue	  to	  grow	  in	  intensity	  and	  frequency,	  the	  consequences	  of	  
failure	  become	  more	  severe.	  
	  
G. Avoiding	  Reactionary	  Measures	  
	  
	   Congress	  has	  an	  opportunity	  to	  balance	  security	  and	  civil	  liberties	  while	  the	  
threat	  is	  still	  manageable.	  	  Other	  countries	  have	  avoided	  the	  issue	  and	  are	  now	  
taking	  drastic	  measures	   to	  address	  cyber	   threats.	   	  Australia	  and	  Great	  Britain,	  
for	  example,	  are	  forcing	  private	  companies	  to	  invest	  resources	  in	  cyber	  defense	  
and	  share	  internal	  data	  about	  attacks.68	  	  In	  Great	  Britain,	  cyber	  attacks	  are	  now	  
regarded	  as	  a	  top	  threat	  to	  national	  security.69	   	   	  Those	  drastic	  measures	  were	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65	  Baldor,	  supra	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  Time	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  Attacks,	  FIN.	  TIMES,	  Jan.	  25,	  
2013,	  https://www.fidelity.co.uk/investor/news-­‐insights/expert-­‐
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taken	   because	   the	   privately	   owned	   critical	   infrastructure	   sectors	   failed	   to	  
maintain	   inadequate	   cyber	   security.70	   	   	   Congress	   can	   avoid	   resorting	   to	  
draconian	   measures	   by	   promoting	   information	   sharing	   and	   establishing	  
minimum	   cyber	   security	   standards	   in	   legislation.71	   	   Congress	   can	   only	   pass	  
legislation	   by	  working	   on	   common	   ground	   to	   shore	   up	   the	  weak	   links	   in	   the	  
cyber	  defense	  chain.	  
	  
IV.	  	  PATCHWORK	  SOLUTIONS	  
	  
A. Administrative	  Agency	  Solutions	  
	  
	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   persistent	   attacks,	   administrative	   agencies	   are	   creating	  
patchwork	   cyber	   solutions.	   	   Administrative	   agencies	   are	   semi-­‐autonomous	  
government	   bodies	   that	   execute	   legislative,	   judicial,	   or	   executive	   functions.72	  	  
The	   apolitical	   nature	   of	   administrative	   agencies	   enables	   them	   to	   create	  
solutions	  to	  large	  problems	  while	  withstanding	  political	  pressure.73	  	  One	  agency	  
that	  has	  been	  particularly	  active	   in	  establishing	  cyber	  security	  measures	   is	  the	  
Department	   of	   Homeland	   Security.	   	   Congress	   established	   DHS	   as	   one	   of	   the	  
fifteen	  administrative	  agencies	  of	   the	  executive	  branch.74	   	   It	   is	   responsible	   for	  
preventing	   and	   minimizing	   terrorist	   attacks	   on	   the	   U.S.75	   	   The	   Department’s	  
attempts	   to	   tackle	   cyber	   security	   problems	   provide	   examples	   of	   how	  
administrative	   agencies	   can	   provide	   intermediate	   solutions	   to	   politically	  
complex	  problems.	  
	  
B. The	  Department	  of	  Homeland	  Security	  
	  
i. Recruiting	  Future	  Cyber	  Warriors	  
	  
	   DHS	   has	   established	   several	   programs	   to	   combat	   cyber	   threats.	   	   One	  
program	   focuses	   on	   recruiting	   future	   cyber	   security	   specialists	   on	   college	  
campuses.	  	  At	  San	  Jose	  State	  University,	  for	  example,	  Secretary	  Napolitano	  laid	  
out	   a	   plan	   to	   build	   a	   cyber	   security	  workforce	   to	   combat	   cyber	   attacks	   in	   an	  
address	   to	   students.76	   	   At	   George	   Mason	   University,	   DHS	   created	   a	   cyber	  
                                                                                                                             
Defense	  Studies	  in	  Estonia	  (May	  3,	  2012),	  available	  at	  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/francis-­‐maude-­‐speech-­‐at-­‐the-­‐international-­‐centre-­‐
for-­‐defence-­‐studies-­‐icds-­‐in-­‐Estonia.	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  Napolitano,	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  the	  
Fourth	  Branch	  of	  Government,	  84	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  573,	  583-­‐84	  (1984)	  (identifying	  modern	  
functions	  of	  administrative	  agencies).	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  Id.	  at	  586.	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  Departments,	  5	  U.S.C.	  §	  101	  (2013).	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specialist	   recruiting	   competition	   called	   the	   “Virginia	   Governor’s	   Cup	   Cyber	  
Challenge.”77	  	  The	  competition	  was	  modeled	  on	  a	  program	  implemented	  by	  the	  
Chinese	   government.78	   	   The	   government	   must	   continue	   these	   recruiting	  
programs	   to	   prepare	   for	   future	   threats.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   preparing	   for	   future	  
threats,	  DHS	  established	  programs	  to	  deal	  with	  current	  threats.	  	  
	  
ii. Addressing	  Current	  Threats	  to	  Utilities	  
	  
	   DHS	  programs	  rely	  on	  overt	  government	  monitoring	  and	  self-­‐reporting.	  	  The	  
U.S.	  Computer	  Emergency	  Readiness	  Team	  (“US-­‐CERT”)	  is	  a	  watch	  and	  warning	  
center	  that	  responds	  to	  cyber	  security	  threats	  to	  infrastructure	  systems.79	  	  	  It	  is	  
a	  system	  that	  detects	  attacks	  after	  they	  have	  occurred.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  US-­‐CERT	  is	  
rapid	  response	  and	  damage	  mitigation.	  	  The	  program	  enables	  the	  government	  
to	   repair	   infrastructure	   cyber	   systems	   soon	   after	   they	   are	   detected.	   	   In	   its	  
current	  application,	  US-­‐CERT	  is	  a	  completely	  reactionary	  program.	  	  Conversely,	  
the	   Industrial	   Control	   Systems	   Cyber	   Emergency	   Response	   Team	   (“ICS-­‐CERT”)	  
attempts	   to	   reduce	   threats	   to	   utilities	   based	   on	   self-­‐reporting.80	   	   It	   partners	  
intelligence	  and	   law	  enforcement	  agencies	  with	  private	  utilities	   to	  collaborate	  
and	  share	  cyber	  threat	  information.81	  	  The	  program	  provides	  private	  utilities	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  interface	  with	  government	  agencies	  about	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  
their	  cyber	  control	  nodes	  before	  a	  debilitating	  attack.82	   	  This	   forward-­‐thinking	  
program	  captures	  the	  tone	  the	  legislature	  should	  seek	  to	  replicate	  in	  legislation.	  
	   ICS-­‐CERT	   fosters	   the	   public-­‐private	   relationship	   between	   utilities	   and	  
government	   agencies.	   	   It	   also	   functions	   as	   an	   on-­‐call	   incident	   response	   team	  
that	   provides	   situational	   awareness	   and	   triages	   cyber	   attacks	   on	   critical	  
infrastructure.83	   	   In	   2010,	   the	   first	   full	   year	   of	   ICS-­‐CERT,	   DHS	   recorded	   41	  
reported	  attacks	  on	  utilities.	  84	  	  In	  the	  year	  2011	  the	  number	  rose	  to	  198.85	  	  All	  
reported	   attacks	  were	   conducted	   through	   cyberspace	   using	  methods	   ranging	  
from	   spear	   phishing	   to	   website	   hyperlinks.86	   	   The	   main	   drawback	   to	   this	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program,	  however,	  is	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  volunteer	  reporting	  from	  companies	  that	  
have	   little	   incentive	   to	   participate.	   	   This	   self-­‐reporting	   method,	   although	  
helpful,	  is	  only	  a	  fraction	  of	  what	  is	  required	  to	  combat	  cyber	  threats.	  	  
	  
iii. Severity	  of	  the	  Threat	  	  
	  
	   Unreported	  cyber	  threats	  can	  lead	  to	  debilitating	  consequences.	  	  In	  August	  
2003,	  an	  unreported	  Internet	  computer	  worm	  corrupted	  the	  control	  systems	  of	  
Ohio’s	  Davis-­‐Besse	  Nuclear	   Power	   Plant.87	   	   The	   attack	   left	   thousands	  without	  
power	   four	  hours.	   	  Similarly,	  an	  attack	  on	  utility	  control	   systems	  that	  manage	  
dams	   could	   cause	   an	   overflow,	   which	   would	   devastate	   a	   local	   area.88	   	   A	  
coordinated	   attack	   on	   multiple	   power	   plants	   would	   result	   in	   massive	  
catastrophe	  and	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  displacement	  of	  countless	  Americans.89	   	  Of	  
additional	  concern	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  the	  Department	  
of	  Defense	  purchase	  over	  29	  million	  megawatt-­‐hours	  of	  electricity	  annually.90	  	  A	  
well-­‐coordinated	  attack	  on	  utilities	  could	  significantly	  impact	  the	  government’s	  
ability	  to	  function.	  
	   Utilities	  are	  the	  most	  targeted	  of	  all	  critical	  infrastructure	  sectors.	  While	  the	  
exact	   number	   of	   attacks	   on	   utilities	   is	   unknown,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   attacks	   are	  
increasing.	  	  Approximately	  60%	  of	  all	  cyber	  attacks	  on	  critical	  infrastructures	  in	  
the	   year	   2011	   were	   on	   utilities.91	   	   In	   the	   year	   2012,	   ICS-­‐CERT	   estimated	  
approximately	  7,2000	  utility	  control	  system	  devices	  were	  targeted	  by	  advanced	  
persistent	  threat	  activity.92	   	  Analysis	  of	   these	  trends	  highlights	  both	  the	  gaunt	  
state	  of	   the	  U.S.’s	  utility	   cyber	   security	   and	   the	  opportunistic	  nature	  of	   cyber	  
attackers.	  	  It	  is	  sobering	  to	  note	  that	  those	  reports	  only	  reflect	  reported	  attacks.	  	  
Despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  DHS	  to	  work	  with	  private	  businesses,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  
tell	   how	  many	   cyber	   attacks	   go	   unreported.	   	   The	  U.S.’s	   critical	   infrastructure	  
should	  not	  depend	  on	  private	   companies	  volunteering	   information.	   	  Congress	  
must	   enact	   comprehensive	   legislation	   that	   provides	   a	   baseline	   cyber	   security	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V.	   CONTRACTING	  A	  STOPGAP	  FROM	  THE	  EXISTING	  UTILITIES	  FRAMEWORK	  
	  
A. How	  Contracting	  Can	  be	  Effective	  
	  
	   Administrative	  agency	  contracting	  would	  provide	  a	  stopgap	  solution	  to	  the	  
utilities	   cyber	   security	   problem.	   	   The	   government	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   enter	  
into	  contracts	  with	  private	  utilities.93	  	  Contracting	  would	  affect	  utilities	  in	  a	  way	  
that	   market	   pressures	   do	   not.	   	   Government	   contracting	   could	   nudge	   the	  
utilities	  sector	  to	  change,	  update,	  or	  modernize	  their	  cyber	  security	  systems	  in	  
order	   to	   stay	   in	   business.	   	   Through	   contracting,	   the	   federal	   agencies	   could	  
require	   private	   utility	   companies	   to	   comply	   with	   minimum	   cyber	   security	  
standards.	  	  Minimum	  standards	  could	  be	  used	  as	  the	  entry	  criteria	  for	  bidding	  
and	   maintaining	   government	   contracts.	   	   This	   would	   increase	   the	   amount	   of	  
utilities	  implementing	  adequate	  cyber	  security	  while	  creating	  a	  uniform	  line	  of	  
defense.	  	  
	  
B. Using	  Preexisting	  Contract	  Frameworks	  
	  
	   Although	   there	   is	   currently	   no	   minimum	   cyber	   security	   requirement	   for	  
utilities	  contracts,	  the	  framework	  for	  physical	  security	  is	  well	  established.	  	  The	  
government	   has	   the	   authority	   to	   regulate	   privately	   owned	   utilities	   in	   the	  
interest	  of	  public	  safety.94	  	  Several	  examples	  include	  the	  Public	  Utilities	  Holding	  
Company	  Act	  (“PUHCA”),	  the	  Federal	  Property	  Administration	  Act	  (“FPAA”),	  and	  
Title	   42	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Code.	   	   PUHCA	   requires	   companies	   to	   report	  
specific	  information	  to	  the	  government	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  public	  safety.95	  	  FPAA	  
is	   a	   Department	   of	   Energy	   (“DOE”)	   regulation,	   which	   grants	   the	   General	  
Services	   Administration	   the	   authority	   to	   establish	   methods	   and	   policies	   for	  
acquiring	  utility	  services	  to	  federal	  agencies.96	  	  FPAA	  may	  be	  able	  to	  add	  cyber	  
policy	   requirements	   at	   its	   discretion.	   	   Title	   42	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Code	  
authorizes	  the	  DOE	  to	  initiate	  and	  modify	  energy	  contracts	  with	  private	  utilities	  
companies.97	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   DOE	   may	   be	   able	   to	   incorporate	   cyber	  
requirements	  into	  contracts	  as	  well.	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i. Two	  Potential	  Approaches	  
	  
	   Between	   PUCHA	   and	   FPAA	   two	  potential	   contractual	   approaches	   emerge.	  	  
In	   the	   first	   approach	   utilities	   would	   agree	   to	   government	   monitoring.	   	   The	  
government	   would	   monitor	   internal	   business	   networks	   to	   ensure	   minimum	  
cyber	   security	   requirements	   are	   maintained.	   Enacted	   in	   1935,	   PUCHA	   was	  
implemented	  to	  protect	  consumers	  from	  risky	  utility	  company	  practices.98	  	  It	  is	  
one	   example	   of	   how	   administrative	   agencies	   could	   use	   contracts	   to	   increase	  
cyber	   security	   by	   monitoring.	   	   In	   2005,	   the	   reformed	   PUHCA	   maintained	   its	  
oversight	   requirement	   to	   ensure	   utilities	   remain	   reliable	   and	   functional.99	  	  
Additionally,	  the	  Act	  requires	  utilities	  holding	  companies	  to	  make	  their	  financial	  
books,	   accounts,	   memoranda,	   and	   costs	   available	   for	   government	   review.100	  	  
Accordingly,	  this	  framework	  may	  allow	  administrative	  agencies	  to	  requirement	  
utilities	   to	   report	   expenses	   spent	   preventing	   or	   rebuilding	   after	   network	  
attacks.	   	   Similarly	   to	   the	   present	   situation,	   at	   that	   time	   utilities	   companies	  
leveraged	   the	   short-­‐term	   benefits	   of	   risky	   behavior	   while	   exposing	   the	  
population	   to	   unacceptable	   risks.101	   	   This	   utilities-­‐focused	   regulation	   is	   an	  
example	   for	  how	  administrative	   agencies	   can	  enhance	   cyber	   security	   through	  
contracting.	  	  
	   PUHCA	  has	   the	   internal	  mechanics	   required	  to	  regulate	  and	  enforce	  cyber	  
security	  through	  contracting.	  	  Specifically,	  Section	  366.1	  establishes	  the	  Federal	  
Energy	   Regulation	   Commission	   (“FERC”)	   as	   the	   administrative	   action	   for	  
enforcing	   PUCHA.102	   	   FERC	   is	   an	   independent	   agency	   that	   regulates	   the	  
interstate	   transmission	   of	   utilities.103	   	   FERC	   enforces	   regulatory	   requirements	  
through	  the	   imposition	  of	  civil	  penalties	  and	  punishments.104	   	   Its	  mission	   is	   to	  
promote	  the	  development	  of	  safe,	  reliable,	  and	  efficient	  utilities	  infrastructure	  
that	  serves	  the	  public	  interest.105	  	  The	  purpose	  for	  requiring	  government	  access	  
to	  sensitive	  information	  was	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  populace.	  	  As	  a	  safeguard	  
for	   preventing	   a	   company’s	   sensitive	   internal	   information,	   Section	   1264(d)	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forbid	  any	  one	  with	  access	  to	  this	  information	  from	  disclosing	  it.	  	  
	   Required	   reporting	  and	   internal	   systems	  monitoring	  would	  aid	  established	  
programs	  like	  ICS-­‐CERT,	  but	  at	  too	  high	  a	  cost.	  	  The	  government	  would	  gain	  the	  
benefit	   of	   not	   having	   to	   rely	   on	   volunteer	   information.	   	  Mandatory	   reporting	  
may	   even	   increase	   government	   efficiency	   in	   preventing	   future	   attacks.	   	   One	  
glaring	  drawback	   to	   this	   approach,	  however,	   is	   that	   it	  would	  put	   the	   solution	  
squarely	  in	  the	  same	  position	  that	  Congress	  now	  finds	  itself	   in.	   	  This	  approach	  
would	   all	   but	   certainly	   aggravate	   the	   ongoing	   civil	   liberties⎯public	   safety	  
debate	  in	  Congress.	  	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  likely	  frustrate	  the	  public-­‐private	  
relationship	  and	  create	  more	  problems	  than	   it	  would	  solve.	   	  A	  contract	  policy	  
requiring	  private	  companies	  to	  allow	  government	  monitoring	  of	   internal	  cyber	  
systems	  would	  likewise	  be	  doomed	  to	  failure.	  	  
	   In	   the	   second	   approach,	   administrative	   agencies	   merely	   verify	   that	  
minimum	  cyber	  security	  standards	  are	  in	  place.	  	  This	  approach	  would	  consist	  of	  
government	   verification	  of	   cyber	   security	   standards.	   	  DOE	  Federal	  Acquisition	  
Regulation	  (“FAR”)	  requires	  all	  federal	  agency	  utilities	  contracts	  comply	  with	  its	  
service	   provisions.106	   	   This	   less	   intrusive	   framework	   allows	   utilities	   to	   meet	  
standards	  set	  and	  verified	  by	  the	  government	  through	  inspections.	  
	   FAR	   has	   the	   requisite	   structure	   to	   enforce	   a	   cyber	   capabilities	   inspection	  
program.	   	   FAR,	   Section	   52.241-­‐6,	   specifies	   the	   physical	   requirements	   utilities	  
must	  maintain	  to	  be	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  contract.107	  	  While	  this	  area	  focuses	  
on	   physical	   equipment,	   it	   could	   be	   expanded	   to	   address	   cyber	   security.	   	   This	  
section	   calls	   for	   government	   participation	   in	   facility	   inspections	   to	   ensure	  
utilities	   remain	   in	   compliance	  with	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   contract.	   	   This	   approach	  
calls	   for	   reviewing	   utilities	   cyber	   security	   without	   invasive	   monitoring.	  	  
Administrative	  agency	  inspections	  could	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  utilities.	  	  	  
	   This	   approach	   would	   give	   private	   utilities	   the	   freedom	   to	   choose	   how	   to	  
meet	  the	  government’s	  standards.	  	  It	  would	  also	  avoid	  the	  ongoing	  civil	  liberties	  
debate	  that	  has	  gridlocked	  Congress.	  
	  
VI.	  	  CONSEQUENCES	  OF	  FAILING	  TO	  ACT	  
	  
A. 	   Attacks	  in	  Perspective	  
	  
	   The	  consequences	  of	  failing	  to	  act	  would	  be	  disastrous.	  US-­‐CERT	  has	  already	  
responded	  to	  more	  than	  106,000	  incident	  reports	  of	  cyber	  attack	  to	  the	  critical	  
infrastructure	  since	  the	  program	  began.108	  	  When	  viewed	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  one	  may	  
be	  tempted	  to	  dismiss	  the	  national	  concern.	  	  Yet,	  when	  viewed	  as	  a	  trend,	  the	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national	  significance	  arises	  to	  the	  foreground.	  	  
	  
B. 	   Cyber	  Attack	  on	  Georgia	  
	  
	   The	   cyber	   attack	   on	   the	   country	   of	   Georgia	   illustrates	   how	   cyber	  warfare	  
will	  be	  used	   in	   future	  conflicts.	   	   In	  August	  2008,	  Georgian	   forces	   launched	  an	  
attack	  against	  separatist	  forces	  sympathetic	  to	  Russia.109	  	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  the	  
Russian	   military	   invaded	   Georgia.110	   	   Before	   the	   Russian	   invasion,	   Georgia’s	  
governmental	   cyber	   systems	   were	   attacked.111	   	   The	   attack	   was	   broad	   and	  
coordinated.	  	  The	  volume	  of	  Internet	  traffic	  into	  Georgia	  increased	  by	  400	  times	  
during	   the	   attack.112	   	   The	   DoS	   attack	   disrupted	   the	   Georgian	   government’s	  
ability	   to	   function	  and	  respond	  to	   the	  Russian	   invasion.	   	  The	  cyber	  attacks	  on	  
Georgia	  began	  weeks	  before	  it	  was	  physically	  invaded.113	  	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  
a	  cyber	  attack	  immediately	  preceded	  a	  physical	  attack	  between	  two	  sovereign	  
nations.114	  	  It	  will	  likely	  not	  be	  the	  last.	  	  	  
	  
C. 	   Cyber	  Attacks	  in	  the	  Future	  
	  
	   A	   fundamental	   tenet	   of	   warfare	   is	   deception.115	   	   The	   ability	   to	   leverage	  
cyber	  attacks	  while	  remaining	  unidentified	  is	  a	  bellwether	  for	  future	  warfare.116	  	  
Cyber	  attacks	  are	  relatively	  inexpensive,	  easy	  to	  execute,	  and	  the	  perpetrators	  
rarely	  get	  caught.117	  	  As	  technology	  like	  the	  kind	  used	  in	  Georgia	  becomes	  more	  
available,	  entities	  will	  continue	  to	  exploit	  cyber	  weaknesses	   in	  nations’	  critical	  
infrastructures.118	   	   To	   this	   day	   the	   attacks	   on	   Georgia’s	   cyber	   systems	   are	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unattributed.119	   	   With	   the	   successful	   attacks	   on	   Georgia	   firmly	   in	   mind,	   it	   is	  
imperative	  that	  America	  solve	  its’	  cyber	  security	  issues.	  	  	  
	  
VII.	  	  CONCLUSION	  
	  
	   America’s	  critical	   infrastructure	   is	  vulnerable	   to	  cyber	  attacks.	  Threats	  and	  
attacks	   to	   the	   U.S.’s	   utilities	   sector	   are	   not	   hypothetical—they	   are	   real	   and	  
ongoing.	  	  The	  utilities	  sector	  is	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  critical	  infrastructure	  sector.	  	  
They	  have	  come	  to	  rely	  on	  cyber	  controls	  to	  cut	  costs	  and	   increase	  efficiency.	  	  
They	   have	   not	   however,	   reciprocally	   increased	   their	   cyber-­‐security	   posture.	  	  
Utilities	   have	   become	   the	   target	   of	   choice	   for	   cyber	   attackers.	   	   The	   public-­‐
private	   relationship	   between	   the	   government	   and	   utility	   companies	   has	  
compounded	  the	  problem.	  	  Without	  market	  pressures,	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  suits	  for	  
failures	  in	  service,	  utilities	  are	  lagging	  behind	  in	  cyber	  security.	  	  The	  stakes	  are	  
too	  high	   to	   rely	   solely	  on	   individual	   companies	   to	  defend	   the	  nation’s	   critical	  
infrastructure.	   	   Only	   legislation	   passed	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Congress	   can	   provide	  
comprehensive	  national	  defense	  to	  combat	  cyber	  threats.	  
	   Congress	  must	  find	  a	  workable	  solution	  to	  this	  complex	  problem.	  	  Central	  to	  
the	   hotly	   contested	   cyber	   defense	   issue	   is	   the	   balance	   between	   civil	   liberties	  
and	  public	  safety.	  	  The	  answer	  lies	  firmly	  in	  the	  confines	  of	  partnership	  between	  
the	  government	  and	  private	  companies.	  	  Congress	  must	  foster	  an	  environment	  
that	   promotes	   information	   sharing	   that	   reflects	   partnership.	   	   Resolving	   civil	  
liberties	   issues	  has	  proven	   to	  be	  a	  daunting	   task;	   yet,	  while	  progress	   is	   being	  
made	  cyber	  attacks	  continue	  to	  grow	  in	  frequency	  and	  magnitude.	  	  	  
	   Administrative	  agencies	  can	  immediately	  begin	  implementing	  stopgap	  cyber	  
defense	   measures	   through	   contracting.	   	   The	   precedence,	   framework,	   and	  
mechanics	  for	  utilities	  regulation	  pursuant	  to	  public	  safety	  are	  well	  established.	  	  
Currently,	   agency	   contracts	   require	   specific	   and	   general	   physical	   security	  
standards.	   	   However,	   they	   do	   not	   yet	   require	   a	   minimum	   cyber	   security	  
threshold	   for	   acquiring	   or	   bidding	   on	   utility	   contracts.	   	   Contracting	  
requirements	  allow	  the	  bidder	  to	  choose	  their	  own	  products	  and	  maintain	  their	  
own	   systems.	   	   Although	   public-­‐private	   information	   sharing	   and	   contracting	   is	  
not	  a	  total	  solution,	  it	  would	  certainly	  help.	  	  Administrative	  agency	  contracting	  
is	   an	   appropriate	   stopgap	   because	   it	   increases	   public	   safety	   without	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encroaching	  on	  civil	   liberties.	   	  This	  stopgap	  would	  give	  the	  Congress	  breathing	  
room	  to	  find	  an	  appropriate	  solution.	  	  	  
	   The	   consequences	   for	   failure	   to	   act	   are	   glaring.	   	   The	   cyber	   attack	   that	  
preceded	   the	   invasion	   of	   Georgia	  was	   a	   clarion	   call	   for	   all	   nation-­‐states.	   	   An	  
attack	  on	  the	  United	  States	  will	  likely	  not	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  smoldering	  ships	  
in	   the	  nation’s	   seaports,	   or	  planes	   crashing	   into	  buildings—it	  will	   be	  with	   the	  
anonymous	   click	   of	   a	   mouse	   that	   turns	   off	   our	   power	   grids,	   releases	   flood	  
waters	  of	  dams,	  and	  melts	  down	  nuclear	  reactors.	  	  
	   America	  must	   continue	   pressing	   on	   towards	   a	   coherent	   solution	  with	   the	  
understanding	   that	   civil	   liberties	   and	   national	   defense	   are	   not	   mutually	  
exclusive	  of	   one	   another.	   	   Yet,	   as	   this	   debate	   continues,	   threats	   to	   the	  U.S.’s	  
infrastructure	  become	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  effective.	  	  Only	  a	  comprehensive	  
solution	  is	  capable	  of	  mending	  the	  gaping	  holes	  in	  the	  nation’s	  common	  cyber	  
defense.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
